Posted in Epistemology, Existentialism, Monday Profile, Perception, Phenomenology, philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Psychology, tagged bodily perception, body-subject, cartesianism, cogito, conception, Descartes, developmental psychology, empiricism, idealism, intellectualism, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Merleau-Ponty, Mind, mind and body, Perception, Phenomenology, phenomenology of perception, philosophy, Psychology, subject and object on December 22, 2008|
1 Comment »
Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961) was a French philosopher and phenomenologist. He continues to be credited as the most influential figure in the development of a philosophical understanding of the importance of the body and corporeality.
His most central work in this regard is The Phenomenology of Perception. Through a phenomenological examination of perception, Merleau-Ponty argued for the significance of the body in perception and conception, which was in opposition to Cartesian dualism– the view that there is a fundamental schism between the mind and body.
Merleau-Ponty instead posited that the body is entailed by perception rather than an object of it. Through this discovery, he breaks down the subject/object dichotomy and concludes that the traditional notion of the Cartesian “cogito” must be replaced by what he refers to as the “body-subject”.
His particular brand of phenomenology was influenced by the desire to refute what he viewed to be the two most misguided tendencies within Western philosophy: empiricism, the view that knowledge comes entirely from sense impressions, and idealism, the metaphysical view that the world is constructed from the mind alone. Thus, his work is fundamental in rearticulating the relationship of the mind– or subject, to the world– or to objects. Ultimately, he argued that knowledge must be constituted of practical, lived and active exposure to the world.
Merleau-Ponty was also a trained psychologist, having lectured extensively on child psychology, development and education. Unfortunately, his life was cut short by a sudden stroke at the early age of 53.
Read Full Post »
Posted in Monday Profile, Neuroscience, philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, tagged Antonio Damasio, BCI, Brain and Creativity Institute, Descartes, Descartes' Error, embodiment, Monday Profile, reason and emotion, somatic-marker hypothesis, Tate Modern on November 17, 2008|
Leave a Comment »
is a Portuguese neuroscientist currently working at the University of Southern California, where he heads USC’s Brain and Creativity Institute
His contributions to the Philosophy of Embodiment are most accessible in his two bestsellers Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain, and The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness.
Contrary to the disembodied dichotomy envisioned by philosopher René Descartes between the mind and the body, Damásio argues throughout his work that the body is the genesis of thought. Central to his argument is a collapse of the classical distinction between reason and emotion. Utilizing his expertise in neuroscience, he argues instead that reason and emotion fundamentally depend upon one another.
Damásio is also well known for proposing what he calls the Somatic-marker Hypothesis, which proposes how emotional processes guide action-oriented decision-making. The hypothesis addresses how decisions and mentality are structured through bodily action.
If you’re in London on December 11th, you’ll be able to catch Damásio at Tate Modern, where he’ll be giving a talk titled, “Embodiment: Body, Mind and Medicine”.
Read Full Post »